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February 23, 2007

Ms. Pat Bartholomew
Clerk of the Court
Utah Supreme Court
450 South State Street, 5th Floor
P.O. Box 140210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-0210
Re: State v. Rhinehart, Case No. 20050635-SC
Utah R. App. P. 24(j) Supplemental Authority Letter
Dear Ms. Bartholomew:
Pursuant to rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State cites State v.
Grimmett, 2007 UT 11, in support of Point I, pages 12-19, of the State's brief. Grimmett was
issued by this Court on January 23, 2007, after the State filed its brief. A copy ofGrimmett
is attached for the Court's convenience.
The State also wishes to clarify a factual assertion in its brief. On page 18 of its brief,
the State asserts that in State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681 (Utah 1997), the defendant "did, in fact,
file a timely motion to withdraw his guilty pleas." The assertion that Taylor filed a timely
motion to withdraw his pleas was based on counsel's review of the original trial proceedings
in that case. According to that record, Taylor filed a motion to withdraw his pleas on June
1, 1991, thirty-one days after he pled guilty. In 1991, June 1 fell on a Saturday. Thus,
counsel concluded that it was likely that the motion to withdraw had been timely filed, but
not date-stamped by the court clerk until later. Moreover, at the time Taylor moved to
withdraw his appeals, no Utah appellate court had held that the statutory time limit for filing
a motion to withdraw a plea was jurisdictional. See State v. Price, 837 P.2d 578, 581-84
(Utah 1992), overruled on other grounds by State v. Ostler,2001 UT 68,111,31 P.3d528.
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Since filing the State's brief in this case, counsel has discovered that a post-conviction
trial court concluded that Taylor's motion to withdraw his pleas was untimely. On appeal
from that ruling, Taylor argued that his motion to withdraw was timely under this Court's
decision in Ostler, 2001 UT 68. See Appellant's Brief at 52 n.19, in Taylor v. State, 2007
UT 12; Case No. 20040262. This Court recently issued a decision in that appeal, but did not
address the timeliness of the motion to withdraw. See Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 12, ^[ 4,1822. Rather, the Court merely stated that Taylor moved to withdraw his pleas "[a] month after
being sentenced," and that the trial court denied the motion. Id. at % 4. The timeliness of
Taylor's motion to withdraw was ultimately irrelevant to this Court's opinion. See id. at f^f
18-22.
Thus, the timeliness of Taylor's motion to withdraw is debatable. However, as the
State explained in its brief, the timeliness of Taylor's motion is also ultimately irrelevant to
the jurisdictional issue in this appeal because neither Taylor opinion addresses the statutory
time bar or its jurisdictional effect.
Because oral argument in this appeal is set for next Thursday, March 1, I would
appreciate it you would promptly distribute this letter and attachment to the Court.
Sincerely,

^ L A U R A B. DUPAIX
Assistant Attorney General
cc: Elizabeth Hunt, counsel for appellant/defendant
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[1] Criminal Law 110 €^274(9)

Grimmett v. StateUtah,2007.
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN
RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE
PERMANENT
LAW
REPORTS.
UNTIL
RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR
WITHDRAWAL.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Adolph Ellington GRIMMETT, Plaintiff and
Appellant,
v.
STATE of Utah, Defendant and Appellee.
No. 20050143.
Jan. 23, 2007.
Background: After he pled guilty and was
convicted of attempted aggravated robbery,
attempted theft, and assault, defendant filed motion
for postconviction relief seeking resentencing, and
motion to withdraw his pleas. The Third District,
Salt Lake, Bruce C. Lubeck, J., granted motion to
resentence and denied subsequent motion to
withdraw pleas. Defendant appealed. The Court of
Appeals denied motion to summarily reverse or
order remand hearing and certified appeal for
transfer.

Holdings: The Supreme Court, Parrish, J., held that:
(1) motion to withdraw pleas was untimely under
prior version of statute, requiring filing of the
motion within 30 days of entry of plea, and
(2) order granting motion for resentencing did not
provide defendant with renewed opportunity to
withdraw his guilty plea, under amended version of
statute.

Affirmed.

110 Criminal Law
110XV Pleas
110k272 Plea of Guilty
110k274 Withdrawal
110k274(9) k. Time for Application.
Most Cited Cases
The filing limitations that govern a criminal
defendant's right to withdraw a guilty plea are
jurisdictional. West's U.C.A. § 77-13-6(2)(b).
[2] Criminal Law 110 €^1044.1(2)
110 Criminal Law
110XXIV Review
HOXXIV(E) Presentation and Reservation in
Lower Court of Grounds of Review
110XXIV(E)1 In General
110kl044 Motion Presenting Objection
110kl044.1 In General; Necessity
of Motion
110kl044.1(2) k. Preliminary
Proceedings;
Indictment,
Information,
or
Complaint. Most Cited Cases
Failure to comply with the requirements of the
statute establishing the filing limitations governing a
criminal defendant's right to withdraw a guilty plea
extinguishes a defendant's right to challenge the
validity of the guilty plea on appeal. West's U.C.A. §
77-13-6(2)(b).
[3] Criminal Law 110 €^>274(9)
110 Criminal Law
110XV Pleas
110k272 Plea of Guilty
110k274 Withdrawal
110k274(9) k. Time for Application.
Most Cited Cases
Motion to withdraw guilty pleas, filed nearly two
years after entry of the pleas, was untimely, under
prior version of statute governing limitations for
filing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, which
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required filing of the motion within 30 days after
entry of the plea. West's U.C.A. § 77-13-6(2)(b).
[4] Criminal Law 110 €^>274(9)
110 Criminal Law
110XV Pleas
110k272 Plea of Guilty
110k274 Withdrawal
110k274(9) k. Time for Application.
Most Cited Cases
Trial court's order granting motion for resentencing
did not provide defendant with a renewed
opportunity to withdraw his guilty pleas, under
amended version of statute governing limitations for
filing motion to withdraw pleas, which required that
motion to withdraw pleas be filed prior to
sentencing, and thus motion to withdraw pleas filed
after motion for resentencing was granted by before
resentencing was announced was untimely. West's
U.C.A. §77-13-6(2)(b).

Elizabeth Hunt, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.
Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Jeffrey S. Gray, Asst.
Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for defendant.
On Certification from the Utah Court of Appeals
PARRISH, Justice:
*1 K 1 Plaintiff Adolph Grimmett appeals from a
denial of his motion to withdraw several guilty
pleas. The question raised by this appeal stems from
the intersection of the nunc pro tunc resentencing
remedy we outlined in State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d
36, 38 (Utah 1981), and Utah Code section
77-13-6(2)(b),
which
establishes
the
time
limitations governing motions to withdraw. More
specifically, we must determine whether a
resentencing order under Johnson extends the time
during which a defendant may file a motion to
withdraw under section 77-13-6(2)(b). We conclude
that it does not and thus affirm.

BACKGROUND
*1 \ 2 In December 2002, Grimmert was charged
by information with aggravated kidnapping,
attempted automobile theft, assault, and public

intoxication. The charges arose from an incident at
the University of Utah during which Grimmert
attacked a woman as she was getting into her car.
Grimmett's appointed counsel, Robin Ljungberg,
advised Grimmert that his ethnicity would
negatively affect his chances at trial. Ljungberg also
stated that the high-profile Elizabeth Smart case "
would have an impact on the jury." Grimmert
followed Ljungberg's advice and pled guilty to a
reduced charge of attempted aggravated robbery,
attempted theft, and assault. The district court
entered a final judgment in March 2003 and
sentenced Grimmert to consecutive prison terms of
varying lengths.
*1 % 3 Several months later, Grimmert began
writing letters to the district court complaining that
Ljungberg had neither filed an appeal nor moved to
withdraw his guilty pleas, despite his requests that
Ljungberg do so. Ljungberg confirmed the truth of
these allegations, but the district court informed
Grimmert that it lacked jurisdiction to reconsider
the sentence and advised him to appeal. The district
court treated Grimmett's fourth letter as a notice of
appeal. The court of appeals subsequently
dismissed the appeal in July 2004, citing its
untimeliness. State v. Grimmett, 2004 UT App
235U, — P.3d — .
*1 K 4 In June 2004, two weeks before the court of
appeals dismissed Grimmett's appeal, his newly
appointed
counsel
filed
a
petition
for
post-conviction relief under the Post-Conviction
Remedies Act (the "PCRA"), Utah Code Ann. §§
78-35a-101 to -110 (2002 & Supp.2006), and rule
65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In his
petition, Grimmert sought resentencing and
alternatively moved to withdraw his guilty pleas,
arguing that they had been involuntary.
*1 1| 5 The State responded to Grimmett's
post-conviction petition by agreeing that he should
be resentenced nunc pro tunc pursuant to our
decision in State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah
1981), thereby restoring his right to appeal. In
January 2005, the district court ordered that
Grimmett be resentenced. Subsequent to the district
court's resentencing order but prior to the actual
resentencing, Grimmett filed a motion to withdraw
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his guilty pleas or, in the alternative, to reduce the
degrees of the offenses prior to being resentenced.
The district court denied the motion and instead
resentenced Grimmett nunc pro tunc, ruling that it
lacked jurisdiction to consider Grimmett's motion to
withdraw his pleas.
*2 f 6 Grimmett filed a timely appeal. He
subsequently filed a motion with the court of
appeals asking that it either summarily reverse his
convictions or order a remand hearing on his claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel under rule 23B
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The court of
appeals denied the motion and certified the appeal
for transfer to this court. We have jurisdiction under
Utah Code section 78-2-2(3)(b).

his guilty pleas on appeal. See Manning v. State,
2005 UT 61, H 36, 122 P.3d 628 ("Any challenge
to [a guilty plea] may only be undertaken following
a timely motion for withdrawal of the guilty plea.").
*2 K 9 Grimmett contends that his January 2005
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas met the
jurisdictional requirements of section 77-13-6(2)(b),
despite the fact that it was filed twenty-two months
after his sentencing. Because section 77-13-6(2)(b)
underwent substantial revision in May 2003 and the
parties disagree about which version of the statute
controls, we review both versions and conclude that
Grimmett's challenge fails under both.

I. THE 1989 VERSION OF UTAH CODE
SECTION 77-13-6(2)(B)
ANALYSIS
*2 f 7 This appeal requires that we determine
whether a defendant timely files a motion to
withdraw his guilty plea under Utah Code section
77-13-6(2)(b) when the motion is filed after the
district court has ordered that the defendant be
resentenced but before the actual resentencing.
Stated differently, the question before us is whether
the application of the Johnson nunc pro tunc
resentencing remedy permits a defendant to
withdraw his guilty pleas under Utah Code section
77-13-6(2)(b), which requires that a motion to
withdraw a plea be made before sentencing. We
conclude that Grimmett's motion to withdraw his
guilty plea was untimely and thus affirm the district
court's denial of Grimmett's motion to withdraw.
*2 [1][2] K 8 Utah Code section 77-13-6(2)(b)
establishes the filing limitations that govern a
criminal defendant's right to withdraw a guilty plea.
These filing limitations are jurisdictional. State v.
Merrill 2005 UT 34, % 20, 114 P.3d 585. Section
77-13-6(2)(b) "imposes a jurisdictional bar on
late-filed motions to withdraw guilty pleas," id. U
17, and failure to comply with its requirements "
extinguishes a defendant's right to challenge the
validity of the guilty plea on appeal," State v. Reyes,
2002 UT 13, H 3, 40 P.3d 630. Grimmett must
therefore comply with the requirements of section
77-13-6(2)(b) if he seeks to challenge the validity of

*2 [3] H 10 The prior version of section
77-13-6(2)(b), which was first adopted by the
legislature in 1989 and remained in effect at the
time of Grimmett's original March 2003 sentencing,
reads as follows: "A request to withdraw a plea of
guilty or no contest is made by motion and shall be
made within 30 days after the entry of the plea "
(emphasis added). Grimmett's motion, filed almost
two years after the entry of his guilty plea, clearly
fails to meet the thirty-day jurisdictional
requirement of the 1989 statute. Grimmett
nevertheless argues that we should excuse his
noncompliance, noting our statement that a "
presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea
should, in general, be liberally granted." State v.
Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Utah 1987).
Gallegos is unavailing here, however, for two
reasons.
*3 U 11 First, Grimmett's January 2005 motion to
withdraw was not a "presentence motion," as it was
filed twenty-two months after the announcement of
his sentence. Second, and more importantly, we
made the statement on which Grimmett relies while
reviewing the 1980 version of section 77-13-6,
which imposed no jurisdictional time limitations on
motions to withdraw. That version read: "A plea of
guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon
good cause shown and with leave of court." Utah
Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1982) (amended 1989 &
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2003), see also State v Abeyta, 852 P 2d 993,
994-96 (Utah 1993) (applying the 1980 version of
the statute and holding that it potentially allowed a
criminal defendant to withdraw a guilty plea almost
three years after sentencing)
*3 T| 12 Section 77-13-6, however, was amended
by the legislature m 1989 to impose a strict
jurisdictional time limit Cf Utah Code Ann §
77-13-6(2)(b) (1995) (amended 2003) ("A request
to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made
by motion and shall be made withm 30 days after
the entry of the plea "), see also Abeyta, 852 P 2d at
995 While courts may still "liberally grant"
presentence motions to withdraw a guilty plea, they
may now do so only if they have jurisdiction Under
the 1989 version of section 77-13-6(2)(b), the
district court had none

II THE 2003 VERSION OF UTAH CODE
SECTION 77-13-6(2)(B)
*3 f 13 We now consider Gnmmett's arguments
withm the context of the 2003 version of section
77-13-6(2)(b) In doing so, we find that the Johnson
resentencing remedy is limited in nature and
purpose and does not allow Grimmett "another
opportunity to present postconviction motions"
State v Goidon, 913 P 2d 350, 356 (Utah 1996)

A Background
*3 K 14 Two months after Gnmmett's original
March 2003 sentencing, the legislature amended
section 77-13-6(2)(b) to remove the thirty-day limit
and instead lequire that criminal defendants file
withdrawal motions before sentencing As amended,
the statute reads "A request to withdraw a plea of
guilty or no contest, except for a plea held m
abeyance, shall be made by motion before sentence
is announced Sentence may not be announced
unless the motion is denied" Utah Code Ann §
77-13-6(2)(b) (2003) (emphasis added)
*3 1f 15 The legislature apparently enacted this
amendment m response to our decision m State v
Ostlei, 2001 UT 68, 31 P 3d 528 In Ostler, we
© 2007 Thomson/West No

interpreted the phrase "30 days after the entry of the
plea" to lefer to the date of entry of final judgment,
not to the date of the plea colloquy Id ^ 11 We
leasoned that substantial unfairness might result
from a plain-language reading of the 1989 statute "
[T]o start the time for moving to withdraw a plea
from the time the district court accepted a plea
could 'deprive the district court of the power to
review a plea before it enters a judgment of
conviction and sentence,' an outcome we found to
be unreasonably unfair" Merrill, 2005 UT 34, ^j
16, 114 P3d 585 (quoting Ostler, 2001 UT 68, If
10, 31 P 3d 528)
*4 f 16 The 2003 amendment to section
77-13-6(2)(b) both embraced and repudiated Ostler
It embraced Ostler's recognition that it would be
unfair to prevent criminal defendants from moving
to withdraw a guilty plea at any time before their
sentencing Cf Utah Code Ann § 77-13-6(2)(b)
(2003) It repudiated Ostler, however, by setting
sentencing as the deadline for filing such motions
Under Ostler, a criminal defendant had thirty days
from "the date of final disposition of the case" to
file a motion to withdraw 2001 UT 68, \ 11, 31
P 3d 528 The 2003 amendment eliminates this
possibility and instead mandates that any motion to
withdraw a plea be filed before sentence is
announced

B The Limited Nature and Purpose of the Nunc
Pro Tunc Resentencing Remedy
*4 [4] 1 17 In Gnmmett's view, the district court's
January 2005 order that he be resentenced nunc pro
tunc reopened the section 77-13-6(2)(b) time frame
and permitted him to file a motion to withdraw at
any time before the actual resentencing In other
words, Giimmett reads the term "sentence" m the
2003 statute as including a "resentence " He thus
reads the 2003 statute as meaning that "[a] request
to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except
for a plea held m abeyance, shall be made by
motion before sentence [or resentence] is
announced " We reject this interpretation
*4 K 18 In State v Johnson, 635 P 2d 36, 38 (Utah
1981), we instructed distnct courts to resentence
to Orig U S Govt Woiks
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criminal defendants nunc pro tunc when those
defendants were prevented from bringing timely
appeals through no fault of their own. Under
Johnson, nunc pro tunc resentencing restarted the
appeal clock and provided defendants with an
opportunity to bring direct appeals of their
convictions. Id. The Johnson nunc pro tunc
resentencing regime stood until our decision in
Manning v. State, 2005 UT 61, 122 P.3d 628,
which was decided about two weeks before
Grimmett filed his initial brief in this case.
*4 \ 19 In Manning, we discarded nunc pro tunc
resentencing in light of the 1996 enactment of the
PCRA, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-35a-101 to -110
(2002 & Supp.2006), and corresponding revisions
to rules 65B and 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. We concluded that "resentencing [was]
no longer a preferred remedy," in part because "
resentencing tends to create more problems than it
resolves." Manning, 2005 UT 61, f 28, 122 P.3d
628 (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed,
Grimmett's case nicely illustrates the problematic
nature of the Johnson remedy.
*4 ^| 20 Our opinion in Manning made clear that "
the Johnson remedy was ultimately designed to
restore a denied right to appeal." Id. Our decisions
in both Manning and Johnson were fashioned to
address a single, key constitutional concern: "[W]e
must provide a readily accessible and procedurally
simple method by which persons improperly denied
their right to appeal can promptly exercise this right.
" Id. 26; accord Johnson, 635 P.2d at 38 ("[If a]
defendant was denied a constitutional right [to a
timely appeal, he] must be provided an opportunity
to take a direct appeal from his conviction.").
Johnson and its progeny thus established the limited
scope and purpose of the nunc pro tunc
resentencing remedy.
*5 K 21 Our decision in State v. Gordon, 913 P.2d
350 (Utah 1996), affirms the limited scope of the
Johnson remedy. In Gordon, a criminal defendant
who had been resentenced nunc pro tunc moved for
a new trial on the grounds of ineffective assistance
of counsel and newly discovered evidence. Id. at
353. This court explained that the motion for a new
trial was untimely:

*5 The only effect of the [resentencing] order was to
provide [the defendant] with another opportunity to
pursue the direct appeal that he was previously
denied. In other words, [the defendant's]
resentencing merely returned him to the position he
was in before his appeal was dismissed. It did not
allow him another opportunity to present
postconviction motions.
*5 Id. at 356 (emphasis added).
*5 U 22 Gordon relied in part on our decision in
State v. Hallett, 856 P.2d 1060, 1062 (Utah 1993),
in which we explained that "[o]nce a trial court on
habeas review determines that a defendant has been
denied the constitutional right to appeal, a direct
appeal should be provided immediately, without
adjudication of any other claims, such as
ineffective assistance of counsel" (emphasis added)
(footnote omitted). Thus, Gordon and Hallett both
illustrate that nunc pro tunc resentencing is a limited
remedy designed to reinstate the crucial
constitutional right to appeal. In both cases, we
expressly rejected the view that the reinstatement of
the right to appeal opened the door for the
consideration of post-conviction motions.
*5 K 23 The 2003 amendment to section
77-13-6(2)(b) did not undercut our reasoning in
Gordon. Under the 1989 statute, a defendant was
required to move to withdraw his plea "within 30
days after the entry of the [final judgment]." See
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) (1995) (amended
2003); see also Ostler, 2001 UT 68, H 11, 31 P.3d
528. This time frame was changed by the 2003
statute, which required that the motion be filed "
before sentence is announced." Utah Code Ann. §
77-13-6(2)(b) (2003). Though this change is not
insignificant,
it does not render Gordon
inapplicable. Our holding in Gordon did not hinge
on the thirty-day deadline imposed by the 1989
statute; it was based instead on the limited scope
and purpose of the nunc pro tunc resentencing
remedy. We fail to see how modification of the
statutory deadline bears on either the nature or the
scope of the nunc pro tunc resentencing remedy.
*5 K 24 We therefore conclude that the district
court's January 2005 resentencing order did not
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reopen the filing window established by section
77-13-6(2)(b). We expressly hold that the Johnson
nunc pro tunc resentencing remedy, which is no
longer available to criminal defendants, Manning,
2005 UT 61, H 11, 122 P.3d 628, does not permit a
criminal defendant to file a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea after the jurisdictional deadline
established by section 77-13-6(2)(b).
*5 % 25 Because Grimmett's motion to withdraw
was untimely under both versions of section
77-13-6(2)(b), we have no jurisdiction to consider
his challenge to the validity of his guilty pleas. See
State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, % 3, 40 P.3d 630 ("
[B]ecause [the defendant] did not move to withdraw
his guilty plea within thirty days after the entry of
the plea, we lack jurisdiction to address [his
challenge to his guilty plea] on appeal.").
*6 % 26 Our decision today does not leave
Grimmett without a remedy, however. Section
77-13-6(2)(c) (2003) expressly states that an
untimely challenge to a guilty plea "shall be
pursued under" the PCRA and rule 65C of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.FN1 We further note that
should Grimmett avail himself of this remedy, he
may be "appointed] counsel on a pro bono basis,"
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-109(l) (2002). But see
Hutchings v. State, 2003 UT 52, f 20, 84 P.3d
1150 (stating that defendants have "no statutory or
constitutional right to counsel in a civil petition for
post-conviction relief). Given the circumstances
that have led him to this point and the fact that the
merits of his argument have not yet been addressed,
Grimmett appears to be a prime candidate to benefit
from the district court's discretion to appoint
counsel.

U 28 Chief Justice DURHAM, Associate Chief
Justice WILKINS, Justice DURRANT, and Justice
NEHRING concur in Justice PARRISH's opinion.
FN1. Grimmett has already petitioned for
post-conviction relief once, in June 2004.
The State responded to that petition by "
erroneously indicat [ing] ... that a
challenge to defendant's guilty pleas could
be made on direct appeal through a 23B
remand hearing." The State has indicated
in its brief that because of its error, it will "
not move to dismiss a petition challenging
the validity of [Grimmett's] pleas as
successive."
Utah,2007.
Grimmett v. State
... p.3d — 9 2007 WL 148854 (Utah), 2007 UT 11
END OF DOCUMENT

CONCLUSION
*6 U 27 We affirm the district court's denial of
Grimmett's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas and
hold that the Johnson nunc pro tunc resentencing
remedy does not permit him a second bite at the
apple under Utah Code section 77-13-6(2)(b).
Because Grimmett did not file a timely motion to
withdraw his guilty pleas, we have no jurisdiction to
consider his attack on their validity. Affirmed.
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

